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A Proposal for a Continuing
Public Prosecutor
By LLOYD N. CUTLER*
In the fall of 1973, after the "Saturday Night Massacre," there
were several proposals that once Watergate was behind us, we should
create an ongoing public prosecutor, independent of direction by the
executive branch, and charged with the investigation and prosecution
of violations of federal election laws and federal crimes committed by
high government officials. The Senate Watergate Committee has en-
dorsed this recommendation. Senator Ervin has recently introduced a
bill to carry it into effect.
The reasons for the current interest in creating a continuing
public prosecutor are clear. The attorney general and his principal
assistants in the Department of Justice are not simply prosecuting of-
ficers but are also appointees of the president and members of an
elected administration team that usually hopes for re-election. They
have an obvious conflicts of interest when they investigate crimes that
have been committed in their own election campaigns or thereafter by
high officers of the executive branch. In directing the attorney general,
the president and his White House aides have equally obvious con-
flicts. Moreover, because of the live-and-let-live principle of elective
politics, they may be similarly reluctant to investigate the conduct of
their predecessors and the campaign finances of the opposing party.
We tend to follow the supposed rule of the old Chinese war lords
that you never kill your prisoners, because in two or three years' time
you were bound -to become a prisoner yourself.
Conflicts of this sort are doubly incapacitating. They prevent un-
fettered and vigorous prosecution of those who should be prosecuted.
Equally important, they breed public distrust of decisions not to pros-
ecute that may be entirely justified on their merits, and would be
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accepted as such if made by a prosecutor free from any conflict of
interest.
We have recognized this need for an independent prosecuting
official every two or -three decades, when instances of official miscon-
duct and conflict of interest have become particularly notorious. Our
experience with these special prosecutors has been salutary. Not only
have they successfully developed cases that had already surfaced but, in
the course of their investigations, they have discovered and prosecuted
additional crimes that we would never have known about had they
not been appointed. Mr. Cox and Mr. Jaworski, for example, have
filed and successfully prosecuted the only significant campaign financ-
ing cases that have been brought -by the government of the United
States in the last forty years.
What independent prosecutors uncover once we appoint them
suggests that official and campaign misconduct is not rare, and that
that it tends to flourish whenever there is little reason to fear prosecu-
tion. Teapot Dome and Watergate may have provided us rare glimpses
of predators that regularly roam beneath the surface of the political
waters. For example, we never learned from the Eisenhower or Ken-
nedy administrations how much money business friends gave Sherman
Adams over the years, or why he was never even prosecuted for tax
evasion.
How many of us expect that, as a result of Watergate, the conduct
of political campaigns and the behavior of public officials will funda-
mentally change? How long will it be before we once again, in Mr.
Harding's phrase, return to normalcy?
We should not be content with a system that requires massive
purgatives once a generation. An ongoing institution devoted to the
investigation and prosecution of such offenses would increase the likeli-
hood of 'bringing offenders to justice, and its very existence could deter
offenses that would be committed in its absence. Most important, a
continuing public prosecutor might go a long way in restoring the public
confidence in our institutions that is essential to the operation of a de-
mocracy, that seems to be diminishing with every passing day.
Some argue that if men of integrity occupied the office of attorney
general and the offices in the White House whose occupants deal with
the attorney general, then no other remedy would be needed. I do
not think that integrity is enough. In other situations where men of
integrity find they have conflicts of interest-and men of integrity
can have, conflicts of jnterest-we A agree that their duty is to .d -
[VCol. 2
qualify themselves, to have someone else do the job, even though they
may 'be men of such high character that -they are capable of overcoming
the conflict and discharging their responsibilities conscientiously.
There are men who are capable of doing that, as we all know;
but there are also men who are not capable. The appearance of con-
flict is as dangerous to public confidence in the administration of justice
as is -true conflict itself. Having men of integrity operate in the face
of conflict is an insufficient protection for a system of justice, and insuf-
ficient to warrant the confidence of thepublic.
When Mr. Richardson made his decisions in the case of Mr.
Agnew, he came close to stretching public confidence in the ability of
a man of the highest integrity to deal uprightly with an acute political
situation. I believe he brought it off, but I do not think that we can
depend for the success of our institutions on having heroes like Mr.
Richardson around all -the time. Of -the last twenty attorneys general,
at least one in four fell short of what most would regard as an impecca-
ble standard of integrity. We certainly have not had twenty consecu-
tive heroes as attorney general. We have had a few.
Creation of an independent public prosecutor would be neither
unconstitutional nor unwise. The only serious constitutional question
is whether article II, vesting the power to execute the laws in the presi-
dent, requires that senior prosecuting officials of the nation must act
under the president's direction even when he or they have a conflict
of interest. One cannot read the Constitution as forcing us to tolerate
conflicts of interest on the part of the president, the attorney general,
and their immediate assistants that we cannot, and do not, tolerate
in mere judges and lawyers.
To minimize constitutional problems, the public prosecutor should
be nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. To
assure his nonpolitical status, I would provide for a six year term,
make him removable only for misconduct or incapacity, and bar
him from thereafter holding elective federal office. To assure har-
mony with the Department of Justice, I would preserve the prosecutor's
present status within the department, with his jurisdiction limited to
election offenses and breaches of public trust by presidential appoint-
ees, and, within that limited field, with statutory independence of the
president and the attorney general. If there is concern that charges
involving presidential appointees are likely to be too rare to keep him
busy, the prosecutor's jurisdiction could be enlarged to include
breaches of Mtrst at somewhat lower levels of the federal service. A
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case might also be made for including charges of misconduct by govern-
ment law enforcement agents involving mistreatment of private citi-
zens-for example, the recent narcotics agent raids-where the depart-
ment's conflict of interest is equally apparent.
As to the wisdom of the proposal, many believe that the power
to prosecute is so -intimately connected with the other powers of the
executive -that no one should exercise this power independent of the
president. The argument makes sense in the context of discretionary
enforcement decisions with a high degree of economic or social con-
tent-such as antitrust or civil rights cases-which involve policy judg-
ments that may cut across other policies -that the administration is
simultaneously pursuing. But in the field of political crimes where
conflicts of interest are involved, this argument, it seems to me, must
bow to the fundamental principle 'that no man can be a prosecutor
or judge in his own case.
Moreover, we have many American and English precedents for
separating -the executive and enforcement powers. While our own
federal government has never created an independent prosecuting
office for criminal cases, it has vested officers such as the comptroller
general and numerous regulatory agencies with responsibility for
the civil enforcement of many laws, including in some cases the power
to enforce through its own attorneys rather 'than the Department of
Justice. In the new Campaign Financing Act we have vested civil
investigation and enforcement power in a new and independent
Campaign Financing Commission. Moreover, a majority of the states
provide for independently elected attorneys general. Many of them
are of the opposite party -than the governor and have political as well
as statutory independence. In England, it has been part of the
unwritten constitution for fifty years that the attorney general and -the
public prosecutor make enforcement decisions independent of the
prime minister and the rest of the cabinet. In the words of Lord
MacDermott, a leading English jurist:
the days are gone when a subservient Attorney [meaning the
attorney general of Great Britain] could be told whom to lay by
the heels or whom to spare. He must now maintain complete in-
dependence in this difficult and sometimes delicate sphere, and if
he fails to do so, the remedy lies in -is dismissal, or that of the
administration.
Other advocates of the status quo say that to create an indepen-
dent special prosecutor would do great harm to the morale and self
esteem of the Department of Justice, and especially its criminal and
tax divisions. I cannot see why this would be so. It does more harm
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to -the morale and self esteem of the department when its leaders feel
compelled to act in the face of a conflict of interest-instead of ab-
staining as our normal principles of ethics require-and to report to
and take directions from men in -the White House who are acting
in the face of conflicts of interest. It would relieve them from the
burden of having to risk their professional careers or political futures
in order to bring cases that should be brought. It would also relieve
them of the temptation of bringing cases that should not be brought,
merely to prove they are too virtuous to be influenced by their con-
flicts.
It has also been argued that nonpolitical lawyers of high quality
cannot be recruited for such an office, and that we would get either
nonentities or unscrupulous and ambitious men who would ride the
prosecutor's white horse into the White House. But with the above
precautions, I should think these dangers would be less acute than
when the president appoints and the Senate confirms other government
prosecutors. In any event, I would rather take this risk than today,
leave the prosecution of political crimes in the hands of at least
half the attorneys general since 1920. In an immortal phrase of a
distinguished Senator, one might as well try to deliver a head of lettuce
by means of a rabbit. It just won't get there. Instead, the present
corroding cynicism about our political morality will continue.
Finally, it is argued that most of the time, the prosecutor's office
would have nothing to do. At the very least, he should be quite busy
discharging the Department of Justice's criminal enforcement respon-
sibilities under the new Campaign Financing Act. Moreover, whether
or not the former president is a crook, he is certainly not a fluke.
The qualities that betrayed him and us are far from unique, and we
will see them in future administrations again. To be ready for that
contingency, we need a deterrent we lack today.
If a future public prosecutor should have nothing to do, it will
be because the deterrent has served its purpose. If that should ever
happen, I will eat this word for word.
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